Islam in Northeast – Shadow of the West

The transformative moment that Islam is passing through was resonating in the North East and Bangladesh even before 9/11 had occurred. On February 23, 1998, Fazlur Rahman, leader of the "Jihad Movement in Bangladesh" of which HUJI-Bangladesh is an affiliate, signed the official declaration of jihad against the US alongside others, including Osama Bin Laden. Several Muslim youths from Assam were soon taking the fast track to Pakistan and Afghanistan via Bangladesh to train alongside the Islamists.

Instructions for the Assamese Islamist organisations

It must be emphasised that a majority of Assamese Muslim youths went to places such as Batrasi in PoK as they were under the impression that on return they would be able to improve the lot of their Muslim brethren, for instance by instituting 30% reservation in education and employment, and establish Muslim courts. Unlike NSCN or ULFA, these outfits in the region did not pitch for secession from India, but their West Asian trainers and Pakistan's ISI goaded them onto an altogether different set of objectives, such as shahadat for the cause of Islam, assassination of leaders such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani and institution of a sovereign Islamic state.

Such instructions meant nothing for the Assamese Muslim youths and, disenchanted, they returned to the mainstream. An important Harkat-ul-Mujahideen leader, Abu Bakr Siddiqui told me on December 27, 2002, that they were simply asked to enter Assam, take shelter and wait for their strength to grow. At that time – almost 14 years ago – it seemed as if sleeper cells were being prepared for latter-day activation. An ISI led campaign was already on and the Assam Police was able to thwart the design. However, the sights of al-Qaeda were on this region even during the time: the contiguity of an expanse (Lower Assam, Bangladesh, Rohingya belt of Myanmar) that could possibly emerge as an important seat of Nizamiyyah for the Caliphate in construction appealed to the pan-Islamist deluded fanatics in Osama and his associates.

A close study of al-Qaeda would showcase that their perspective planning is
spectacularly scientific. One can be certain that Ayman-al- Zawahiri would never have made a statement (as he did on September 3, 2014) unless al-Qaeda (or its franchises) had put in place a capability of terror in India, Bangladesh and the neighbourhood, at least through its many affiliates.

Where does Daesh come in?

Analyses that have come to the fore in the backdrop of Ayman al-Zawahiri's September 3, 2014, statement – by which he proclaimed the creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent – is loaded with allusions to the setbacks that al-Qaeda has faced since its finest hours of 9/11. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (according to most accounts) was created in order to counter the discernible accomplishments of what was once its surrogate, al-Qaeda in Iraq, now Daesh.

However, I have always maintained that the dissonance that appeared apparent between al-Qaeda and Daesh to most was in reality only a ruse. But continual counsel to the effect did not prevail, and the counter terrorism establishment "lost the plot", and in the bargain, face. Ability to think out-of-the box and lives were lost. In reality, there has always been a strategic convergence of objective. To that end, whereas al-Qaeda concentrated on the far enemy, the immediate goal of Daesh, a veritable metrics driven military command and control machinery, was that of holding and expanding territory, which indeed it is doing in Iraq and Syria.

However, setbacks in the field – in recent times – that Daesh has been experiencing have led it to change tactics, a stratagem that it is undertaking in concert with al-Qaeda. Having created and established the myth that there is a difference between the two and thereby generating considerable confusion in Op Inherent Resolve, Daesh has now begun to motivationally concentrate on the far enemy as well. The objective is clear. Although there was always a convergence between al-Qaeda and Daesh, homegrown Islamist outfits that were mushrooming in every nook and cranny (and who, in their narrow, regional confusion, were piggy-backing either al-Qaeda or Daesh!) had to be correctly aligned as franchises, albeit at this time in the "either-or" fashion that they had already affiliated themselves to.

Therefore, even as Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) swore its allegiance to Daesh, the Ansarullah Bangla Team attributed its loyalty to al-Qaeda. Indeed, the compartmentalisation of agenda and action continues till the time of writing, with different groups claiming responsibility for acts of violence across Bangladesh. Notwithstanding the perplexity of the situation, it is my considered opinion that it has not only furthered the ingress of a united Salafi agenda into the region, but has succeeded in proliferating "Op Confusion" in the security establishment. A calibrated comprehensive and integrated drive against one distinct threat has dissipated into a multiplicity of disarray, as a result of non-comprehension of the minimalism of a simple case by which a far enemy has striven to traverse the distance from the Middle East to Islamist agenda and modus operandi.

One aspect that must not be disregarded is the unity of purpose in the Islamist agenda, especially in the post 9/11 era. It is al-Qaeda – alongside its "senate", The Khorasan Group, that is the prime salar-e-Allah of all Islamist action across the globe. Action in Iraq, the Arab peninsula, the Islamic Maghreb and now the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent was earlier directed from either the caves in Tora Bora, or safe houses in Djakarta/Chittagong/Idlib, but has now shifted to Aleppo, where it coordinates its moves with Daesh. It is of little consequence whether al-Qaeda temporarily wore or wears the garb of a Sirajuddin Haqqani, Abu Bakr Bashir or the presently infamous Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose Daesh (despite reports that there was a break with al-Qaeda) is presently being aided by al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's Syrian franchise against the US-led coalition: the latter is being denounced as simply "war against Islam". The interchangeability has ascertained that names mean little where important action is at stake.

What is the Khorasan Group?

Khorasan is a historical term for a region overlapping modern-day Afghanistan and Iran. The Khorasan Group is an elite group of senior al-Qaeda members operating out of Aleppo in Syria. Members of this group include Pakistanis, Palestinians, Afghans, Chechnyans, Yemenis and Egyptians, to name just a few. It takes all important decisions of the al-Qaeda, which like Daesh is a matrix driven military command, which specifically means that it has a strong unified, coherent leadership structure that commands from the top down, even to the extent of "lone-wolf operations", a methodology that is presently gaining in currency as it is becoming increasingly difficult for Daesh supporters to make the Hijrah or the journey to Syria-Iraq. The only known member of The Khorasan Group is Mohsin al-Fadhli and Abu Yusuf Al-Turki. Both are reported to have been killed on September 23, 2014, by US air strikes in Syria. There are indications that some members of the Khorasan Group (including Abu Yusuf Al-Turki) were part of an elite sniper subunit of the al-Nusra Front that was known as the Wolf Group; it was also called al-Qaeda snipers. Incidentally, it is The Khorasan Group that created the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.

Recent arrests in Assam

What about the recent arrests in Assam? Is there a Bangladesh angle to it?

The 42 JMB arrests made till date in Assam were a quick, immediate and laudable reaction by an alert Special Branch to nip the problem in the bud in the wake of the Burdwan blasts. Many Assamese youths from the Muslim community were wooed into JMB with all sorts of propagandist ploys, including the argument that the Holy Quran is not taught properly in Assam.

Sheikh Hasina's bold actions against Islamist fundamentalism have led many Islamists to flee the country and enter Assam. There should be (as I have stated several times, including during my recent visit to Dhaka) a unified security architecture for the region.

Daesh's use of the term "Bengal" – to my mind – encompasses Bangladesh, West Bengal, Assam and the Rohingya Belt of Myanmar. There must be no ambiguity about it. But how does Daesh propagate its views?

It does so through websites, people-to-people contact and through Dabiq, its online mouthpiece. The 12th and 14th issues of Dabiq (as also an exclusive video on India released recently) were dedicated to the above mentioned "Bengal".

Mainstay of religious terrorism

Religious terrorism made serious gains as an ideology of terrorism at the national level where it is usually combined with some form of radical nationalism. At the transnational and global level it had its biggest effect in the post-Cold War era: demonstrations of which were felt both by 9/11 and post that incident. It must be understood that of all "motivational" types of terrorism, religious terrorism is best suited – especially in ideological terms – to generate the most advanced patterns of internationalisation, even up to the level of achieving fully transnational goals, activities, agenda and organisational forms.

The threat to India, Kashmir, Gujarat and Assam is only a special manner in which this aspect is being manifested. Non-state Islamist action in India – whether by Indian Mujahedeen (a veritable surrogate of SIMI) or Lashkar-e-Taiba – has the same underlying theme, the political element. What, after all, are the Caliphate and the Nizam-e-Mustafa that the Islamists of any hue seek? Analysts who are of the opinion that the Islamic State has outdone al-Qaeda's successes, achieving more ground than it to take the lead in the global Islamist movement are mistaken. In the words of the Islamist scholar and forensic psychiatrist, Marc Sageman, "the present wave of terrorism directed at the far enemy is an intentional strategy of a Muslim revivalist social movement… its appeal lies in its apparent simplicity and elegance that resonate with concerned Muslims not well schooled in traditional Muslim teaching, which it rejects." Strategies and tactics evolve, and a sound theoretician of practice may even "create' dissonance within one's own ranks to create confusion in the enemy camp. Unfortunately, the countering forces have yet to fathom this simple aspect as also the fact that "deception is permitted in Islam in order to mislead the enemy"

There is always a fear from an alien enemy that has for the first time in recent history not just secured territory. I am referring to Daesh's control over vast swathes of land in Iraq and Syria, but also about Islamists from all over the world going off to join the new Caliphate.

We have, therefore, to be very careful and cannot be complacent, especially as the group has made its designs on India quite clear. Terror – in its Islamist manifestation – knows no frontiers. But I know that all right-thinking Muslims of Assam have rejected the militant manifestations of Islam, denying al-Qaeda the storm troopers it would require for a concerted move across the land of Srimanta Sankardeva and Pir Azan Fakir. An accurate policy that does not resort to racial profiling is what is required in India. Also, it must be clearly understood that de-radicalisation is not the answer (there is no such animal), and the accent must be on halting radicalisation with appropriate grace. Gratefully, the new dispensation in Assam and Bangladesh seem to have comprehended this important aspect.

Jaideep Saikia is a reputed Indian expert on terrorism and has written books on Bangladesh, Northeast India and global terrorism.