Can the Awami League prevail?

Based on the ground realities, it is now quite fair to predict that in the "most likely" scenario, the ruling Awami League government will have to handover the stewardship of the nation to another set of players very soon assuming that democratic process remains functioning in Bangladesh. Please put extra-emphasis on the words "most likely", fully acknowledging that things that are "most likely" to occur, not necessarily always occur.

Now let's visualise the hypothetical possibility that the Awami League wants to resort to undemocratic means to prolong its stay in state power. Let's assume this can be done via brute force, or electoral tricks, or through a combination of the both. So let's explore what the key exogenous variables are that the Awami League leadership must keep under their full control to prevail as the ruling party of Bangladesh. What are the most likely directions to be taken by those key variables if the Awami League is to make such a choice?

Control over Western powers

Contrary to the clichéd examples cited by both the extreme right and the left, it is unlikely that the Western powers are hatching a conspiracy to create a failed state in Bangladesh. From the pure standpoint of political game-theory, there should not be any rational desire among the Westerners to create yet another headache in a Muslim majority country for no apparent strategic or economic gain. In fact, given Bangladesh's geographic location and demographic composition, a stable functioning government in Bangladesh is, perhaps, the biggest strategic interest of the West. On top of that, a series of recent survey results will make the Western powers quite cautious to go against the popular will of the people and create unnecessary anti-West sentiments.

The Westerners also may not have any strategic need to provide preferential treatment to either the Awami League or the BNP. Borrowing from game-theory once again, the reasoning here is very simple: both the major parties are as friendly to the Western interests as it can get, despite the existence of occasional irritants (e.g., Bangla Bhai for BNP, and Dr. Muhammad Yunus for Awami League).

Now let's discuss "terrorism" or "Islamic extremism" from the Western perspective. It is reasonable to expect that the Western powers are not forming their opinion on the terrorism situation in Bangladesh solely based on the narratives expressed by the Pro-Awami intellectuals, media, or politicians. The Western powers must have professional intelligence and quantifiable assessments on the terrorism situation in Bangladesh. Therefore, knowing what is in the public domain already, it is most likely that a quantitative and systematic analysis of terrorism, let that be Islamic or otherwise, will reveal two things to the Western powers: firstly, the Bangladesh terrorism situation is not that bad in comparison to even, for say, a country like India; and secondly, no major Bangladeshi political parties have any genuine political interest or means to be in the business of terrorism at a global scale. It is fairly safe to assume that the above statement is true for any major political party, Islamic or secular, with at least 1% electoral votes in national elections. It is also fair to assume that even if a political party intends to facilitate a global terrorist outfit, the oversight of existing geopolitical forces, internal institutions, and the Bangladeshi society at large will make it fairly difficult to materialise.

Therefore, summing up the above three points, 1.) Westerners are not hatching a conspiracy to create a failed-state in Bangladesh, 2.) All the major Bangladeshi parties are going to strongly serve key Western concerns from a policy standpoint, and 3.) No major political party in Bangladesh is engaged in the business of global terrorism; it is highly unlikely that the Western powers will do anything extraordinary to keep the Awami League, or for that matter any other political party, in power via undemocratic means. If the situation goes out of control, the West may happily support an alternative structure, as opposed to making a biased choice favouring the existing players.

Controlling the judiciary, bureaucracy, and the armed services

Unlike some other democracies like even Pakistan, where the judiciary still remains a wild-card for any undemocratic power grabber, in Bangladesh the judiciary remains predictably stable in favour of any government with a firm grip on other key branches of the nation state. Therefore, the judiciary is not expected to be the rebel in the block.

As for the bureaucracy, it is fair to state that all of the elected governments of the last 24 years in Bangladesh, including the current government, have maintained strong grip over the civil and military bureaucracy. However, if history is any guide, bureaucrats have always shown a tendency to follow the direction of the wind.

Bangladeshis are by and large ethnically homogeneous. Although intense political rivalries exist among the populace, such rivalry still hasn't reached the extent experienced in other countries; for example, the Middle East, where their rivalries often cross religious or sectarian lines. Therefore, the allegiance of the most loyal of the political appointees in any Bangladeshi administration is in general "opportunistic" – not the kind of allegiance that "sectarian" or "ethnic" divide can create.

Therefore, driven by the desire to maintain class-interests, opportunistic human behaviour, and lacking the intensity typical of sectarian or ethnic allegiance, it is unlikely for the Bangladeshi civil or military bureaucracy to blindly tag-along any undemocratic government, run by either of the two major political parties.

Controlling a united opposition

Rarely in the last 25 years of the post-democratic Bangladesh, have the unity among the opposition forces been as strong as it stands today. Along with a cohort of leftist parties with insignificant electoral strength, the ruling Awami League is fighting against a united opposition coalition, which includes the main opposition party BNP, the main Islamic party Jamaat-e-Islami, and the indirect support of the third major political party Jatya Party. On top of that, for the first time in Bangladesh's history, almost the entire "Islam leaning" political forces, who historically remained fractured and bitterly divided, are assumed to be united against the current regime.

Several surveys have shown that about 80% of the people, including a number of the Awami League supporters, support the idea of a caretaker government, which is the main political demand of the opposition. The survey also suggests that a significant majority of the general people are currently leaning towards the BNP. Adding this survey result with the new found unity among the Islamic voting bloc, it is fair to say that the majority of the Bangladeshis are not going to rally behind an Awami League government, if it continues to govern via undemocratic means.

If history is any guide, it is seen that when a third world government faces a united opposition, but lacks key Western support, it is unlikely to sustain. Please note though, in Bangladesh's unique context, it is possible to sustain a government by defying the wish of the Westerners, if and only if, India's staunch and unequivocal support remains.

Managing India, the most important geopolitical factor

The ground realities of Bangladesh power politics suggest that the Indian support is currently as important, if not more, than the Western support for any government, particularly for the ones lacking democratic legitimacy. Due to lack of an intense and pro-active Chinese diplomatic intervention, the Indian geopolitical desire reigns supreme in the country. The Awami League has a major advantage here, since it has historically enjoyed solid ties with India, particularly with the Indian Congress Party, which happens to be also in power at the moment.

Now the key question remains whether India and perhaps its key ally Russia, will provide 'extraordinary' support to the Awami League, if it opts for undemocratic means to cling to power. The answer to this question is indeed a million dollar one.

Unlike the Western powers, whose major interests in Bangladesh tag along a global line, India has regional and localised interests. Some of India's interests in Bangladesh are purely "cultural". Historically, the wellbeing of Bangladeshi Hindu community has also been considered a major issue of interest.

It is obvious that a secular, left leaning Awami League led government serves India's "cultural" interests the best. But if one leaves aside the "cultural" interests, it is unlikely to expect any other major policy shift in the Bangladesh-India relationship if a BNP-led coalition comes to power.

Anti-India rhetoric, which used to be a staple in BNP's political speeches in the past, have been in decline over the last one decade to the extent that it has become almost non-existent. The BNP leadership does not even take up some of the legitimate grievances against India anymore. A key example could be the incidents of border killing. It is unlikely that a BNP-led government will go gangbusters cancelling India-Bangladesh treaties signed during the Awami regime. Therefore, by letting the democratic process to go forward, even at the expense of its key ally Awami League, India has nothing to lose. Because from the Indian standpoint, a change of government in Bangladesh will only bring legitimacy to many of the key deals that India have made during the Awami rule.

Given the existence of a docile, increasingly India-friendly BNP, and its proven ally Awami League, which happens to be losing popular momentum at the moment, India will be better-off not supporting an undemocratic government run by any of these two political parties.

What's next?

Summing up all the key variables necessary to stay in state-power in a country of 160 million people like Bangladesh, it is a tricky undertaking. The purpose of this write-up was to address the most crucial variables and their likely directions under a hypothetical scenario where the Awami League wishes to stay in power via undemocratic means.

So what's most likely to happen in the near term? Based on the above discussions, it is expected that both the ruling class and the opposition will be forced to accept a compromise, which will be closer to the demand of the opposition, than the desire of the current government. However, the extent of the bloodshed, political drama and diplomatic twists-n-turns prior to that compromise is beyond the realm of any logical forecast.

For our part, let us all pray that sanity prevails, and all the parties involved, both foreign and local, make decisions keeping in mind their self-interests only.

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Shafquat Rabbee is a freelance writer and social-media activist.