Did Shahbagh push AL to go hard line?

The initial period of euphoric enthusiasm, mobilisation and rallying cries of the 'Shahbagh Movement' is now facing the reality of a hard-line counter movement both civil and terrorist that is beginning to emerge. The questions that many are asking is simple even as they continue to support the general public demand: a. is there a counter terrorism or anarchy containment plan of the government? b. can we adjust to a society experiencing long term violence and disorder since it has arrived on our doorstep?

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The stages that led to the present situation began in the political unwillingness or inability to try those accused of war crimes in the first few years after 1971. It was a time when India and Pakistan wanted a rapprochement and Bangladesh priorities really didn't matter. But those accused of direct war crimes were not on any amnesty list.

When Zia came to power the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami was lifted in one of the most cynical moves in political history and soon afterwards Jamaat began rebuilding its bases. It was in 1990 after the fall of Ershad that it became mainstreamed. By participating in that movement with both the BNP and the AL its presence became halal in national politics. JI was an ally of the BNP in 1991 and when the AL came to power in 1996, it was not banned either. In the election of 2001, it played a critical role in the electoral alliance that took both JI and the BNP to power. Yet there was no political demand for JI's ban. By itself it was not a political electoral factor but JI support to the BNP made it a factor for both the parties. Perhaps the ban idea may have come in after that for the AL.

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The AL had lost a lot of its popularity just before the ICT verdicts were announced. It wasn't just the Padma bridge funding and corruption mess, the Hallmark and Destiny case, the share market crash and a host of other issues but the incumbency factor as well. But such issues are gone now and anybody raising them will be branded as traitors. At the moment the AL's status depends on how many death sentences it passes and not its governance performance which is great if one supports the AL, thanks to Shahbagh.

The AL came to power in 1996 but there was no mention of any Jamaat-e-Islami ban. It was much easier then but the question never popped up. In fact, it was not a demand in 2008 either and not even when the verdicts were announced. It was not till Shahbagh was vocal did the AL move and 'accept' the Shahbagh demand. Public interest in the formation and process of the trial was never there and will never be. The reason of course is that nobody wants a fair or unfair trial, all they want is a death sentence from the trial. It's the crowd that insists on being the ultimate decider and not the court. But that is how the ICT was perceived by the people, a revenge facilitating mechanism not a legal body. That was a political decision.

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As pro-trial lawyers have pointed out, the prosecution team was probably not efficient enough to make a proper case against Quader Molla and the court had no other way out than to pronounce the life imprisonment and trigger the massive protest that has become known as the Shahbagh phenomenon. It seems ineptitude can trigger great history as the events show. But it's also obvious that the AL didn't take the court process seriously. Had they did, the evidence gathering and case presentation would not have been left wanting. Hiring several new lawyers after the fiasco shows that the AL thought it was a no-problem trial. It's not full in charge of and is hoping to stay close to public demands rather than lead.

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But the political phase seems to be declining and the militant phase is becoming louder. The AL has been seriously ambushed by Shahbagh and it seems the AL is not sure what to do next. Whoever is carrying out the attacks and by all logic it seems to be the Jamaat-e-Islami and its wings, they know their business. If the first stage was on direct confrontation, they have quickly moved away from it and no large processions are being stopped by the police. They have also taken to selective killings as the blogger death and attacks suggest. Now they are being accused of a new terror tactic which is to attack relatives and friends of their enemies. This is common of many Jihadist tactics and it has worked in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

In both places nationalist sentiments have played a major role in making 'liberators' unpopular. In Bangladesh, the JI seems to have mobilised 'religion' quite effectively and its power base and supporters remain unaffected by the Shahbagh phenomenon. The meta discussion has shifted significantly and both the government and Shahbagh are spending a lot of time defending its position that it isn't against Islam.

But the price of the crisis is falling on Hindu people as well and it's not just that some have been killed and many of their property including puja mandaps destroyed but they now live in a state of fear. Although in 1971, the majority population who fought for a nationalist state were Muslims, it's the Hindus who paid the highest price. Vulnerable and not sure of a future which has suddenly become uncertain, they once again have become sacrificial lambs, strangers in their own lands.

The adivasis have put in a strange space by a movement that is insistently Bengali. Some have even said that they should have no problems with slogans that say everyone is a Bengali. Like minorities everywhere, they have a shaky existence during any nationalist upsurges.

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The moderate spaces have been gutted by all the forces involved and only 'sides' remain which is scary for a country so devastated by 'sides' taking or partisanship. JI seems to have become ready for the long haul while the Government is left floundering and unable to protect its own citizens. Is it the pathological fear of any political alternative grouping which made it quickly become so ready to accept all the demands so that no force could be seen as a new option? Did Shahbagh's popularity scare the AL to commit themselves to steps it was neither willing nor ready to take?

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With every passing day, things get more morbid as discussion between the two has little chance of succeeding. The AL can't back down on the ICT and the 15th amendment and the BNP can't accept the Shahbagh inspired verdicts as they see it. The hope for a dialogue is more about the desperation of hope rather than any hope of resolution. But let's hope, even though for the moment, an answer may seem elusive.

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Afsan Chowdhury is a journalist, activist and writer.