1971: why India and Bangladesh should be mutually grateful

Afsan Chowdhury
Published : 15 Dec 2010, 03:18 PM
Updated : 15 Dec 2010, 03:18 PM

The war in 1971 was a complex one involving several parties and groups.  At one level, it was the Indo-Pak war as two enemies slugged it out and India won defeating Pakistan. The surrender ceremony held at Dhaka has become an iconic event for Indian and Bangladeshis and a painful one for Pakistanis. Indians and Pakistanis follow this narrative.

Bangladeshis believe that it was Bangladesh's national war which gave rise to the state of Bangladesh and that was the real war. The Indo-Pak war is in fact a by-product of the Bangladesh war.

They also contest the Indian narrative which claims that "India liberated Bangladesh" sounding as if a favour was done to them. Many Bangladeshis also believe that Indian intervention was actually an attempt to impede the nationalist movement which without Indian assistance would have succeeded in the long run. They argue that a longer war would have led to Leftists in leadership, something India didn't want.

None of these are full or complete and it's in the mix of all these that the truth lies. However, none accept the argument of the others.

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Pakistan and India had been enemies for long and had fought two wars — in 1948 and 1965 — and hating each other was and still is a national objective and obsession. Pakistan in particular had evolved into a state where national security/fighting India was its primary goal leading to an army-led state.

India had a much better political structure and economy and an army that was under civilian control. India is also obsessed with Pakistan considering it to be the prime enemy. However, while Pakistan had only one enemy —India; India has two — Pakistan and China. India was humiliated by China in 1962 during the Indo-China war and parts of India went under Chinese control.

China is also Pakistan's main friend in the region making it a deadly combination for India. In 1971, the situation offered India great opportunities. Apart from humbling its main historical enemy, it was also a chance to reduce the Chinese stranglehold on India with Pakistan acting as a proxy of sorts.

Indian anxiety about China was intense and part of 1971 war planning. It kept the Indo-China border on guard during all nine months of 1971 and the final attack on Dhaka was planned for December when snow fall would make the mountain borders impossible for Chinese troops to cross into India "on the pretext of helping Pakistan". It was only after snowfall started that such troops were airlifted to participate in the Bangladesh theatre, according to senior Indian officials.

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While Pakistan muddles its way through one of the most foolish conducts of any war anywhere practically creating a positive scenario for India to intervene, the situation was handled far more maturely and in a calculated manner by India. According to K. B. Lal, India's Defence secretary in 1971, PM Indira Gandhi faced a lot of pressure particularly from Indian Bengali groups and the Right to immediately attack Pakistan after March. She refused and her military advisers also told her that this was an impossible task given the level of preparation. K. B. Lal was shifted from the ministry of commerce to defence and was told to ensure that there were sufficient munitions to fight the war. India began to prepare in earnest and the dateline was December. India didn't have any plan to attack Pakistan but of course hoped one day that would be possible.

Why Pakistan delivered in 1971 is a puzzle but India took full advantage of that 'gift'.

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Bangladeshis find it difficult to accept that they were not capable of winning the war by themselves. It had few resources and little organisation and before October — Indo-Russia Treaty — few weapons too. Their sanctuary was India, camps were in India and many Indians fought with them covertly. The December push ensured victory to the joint forces and that was impossible without India.

Bangladeshis suffering, both in refugee camps and inside Bangladesh were incredible. To argue that Bangladesh could go on and on is not a realistic assessment. The Mukti Bahini harassed Pakistanis effectively but couldn't deliver much in frontal warfare. The three BD army forces, — Khaled force, Zia force and Shafiullah force — were raised as conventional army formations meant to confront Pakistan militarily but they failed to do so. Without India, Bangladesh could not have won the war on its own.

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India had all the cards in hand when it planned the final assault. It had 10 million refugees who were a big burden and also the reason to attack Pakistan. It had few options left other than to attack Pakistan for its own survival. Pakistan's actions had turned India into a global white knight.

The Bangladesh Mujibnagar government was located in India and dependent on India for functioning. It represented electoral victors who had been denied victory, a fact that made them legitimate in the world's eyes. It was overwhelmingly popular inside Bangladesh as well.

The Mukti Bahini through their hit and run attacks had reduced Pakistani morale and produced the perfect face of partisan liberators. India nursed and supported them.

Most important, Bangladeshis knew the territory of Bangladesh and provided the Indians with all the information and knowledge including maps to mount the attack. As the forces moved in to take Dhaka, Bangladeshis acted as scouts and guides to the Indians as part of the joint forces that proved essential in the victory. Without Bangladeshis, Indian victory was impossible as it had a window of two weeks to finish the attack before international opinion would ensure a ceasefire.

It was a combination of all these elements that led to victory for India.

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Bangladesh had a ragtag band of partisans who had defied all odds to keep an enemy tied down, destroy communications needed for Pak troops movement and created an unmatched support base. It didn't have the capacity to strike a winning blow but without Bangladesh, no winning blow could be struck. It was not a useful partner but a partner without whom victory was not possible.

BD people in India never had great relations with the host during 1971 according to Mujibnagar officials. This is natural as both were fighting their own war and the two wars had separate trajectories. Obviously, there were several wars taking place between all the forces involved and each had their own priorities. There were convergent spaces particularly for India and Bangladesh as they had a common enemy and objective but divergences were obvious too. Because each were fighting their own war, conflict was also inevitable.

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Different war positions lead to different conclusions. To the Indians, independent Bangladesh was a by-product of the bigger Indo-Pak war. In my discussion with many Indians, it's obvious that BD people were considered an excuse for India's main objective which was 'dismembering' Pakistan. And this position is entirely justified.

To Pakistan, it was also a Pak-India war and the Bangladeshis were running a guerrilla war as an Indian proxy.

To Bangladeshis, their war that is Pak-Bangla war is the main war and dismembering Pakistan was impossible without the conflict generated by the March situation of 1971.

Bangladesh however doesn't figure as a main player in international political discussions or decisions as it was not a state as yet. It was much more a humanitarian issue both for suffering in refugee camps and inside Bangladesh.

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India's position has often been that Bangladesh is ungrateful and 'we got you your liberation' attitude. For a big power, this approach is natural but like so many other scenario, not realistic.  Bangladesh provided India the excuse, the reason and the cause for India to intervene as the final extension of its nationalist movement. In the process, India's intervention couldn't have been a noble venture free of international doubt because of these circumstances. It didn't intervene on behalf of nationalism or its own policy expansion but suffering people and achieved its national objectives.

Without Bangladesh and its movement, Pakistan would never have had a reason to behave the way it did beginning with the refusal to hand over power. The election of 1970 led to the March crackdown events and ultimately the war. It started a chain of events that led to the ultimate defeat of Pakistan at Dhaka

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India couldn't have achieved much in border skirmishes as it hasn't in all these years. The 1971 war was its greatest success as far as Indo-Pak relations went. The fall of Dhaka and surrender of 93,000 soldiers justified many things at a political and intellectual level for India. It proved the falsity of the two-nation theory that gave birth to Pakistan. It proved the superiority of the Indian army and the Indian state through an extreme conflict. It also salvaged the pride that was lost to China in 1962 and finally it cut off a large chunk of territory that housed Pakistan.

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None of this could have happened for India without Bangladesh. Bangladesh was not comparable militarily to India and Pakistan at all but it provided the opportunities and the space to India to fulfil its prime objectives, its triumphant moment. That is why India should be grateful to Bangladesh for allowing it to create its history.

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Afsan Chowdhury was part of the Muktijuddher Dolilpatra Project led by Hasan Hafizur Rahman from 1978 to 1986 which produced 15 volumes of documents on the history of 1971. For the BBC, he produced eight radio series and several chat shows on the issue on 1971. He has produced a video documentary on women and 1971 titled "Tahader Juddhyo". Afsan has edited and co-authored a four-volume history of 1971, "Bangladesh 1971".
He has worked in several parts of the world as a development and Human Rights specialist for the UN and other agencies. Afsan was the Oak Fellow on International Human Rights of the Colby College in the USA in 2008.