Pakistan in 1971: a state without intelligence

Afsan Chowdhury
Published : 8 Dec 2010, 06:25 PM
Updated : 8 Dec 2010, 06:25 PM

Pakistan in 1971 represents the ultimate unintelligent state in action. Its actions were largely determined by decisions taken by its army and intelligence agencies. It is ironic that such army decisions were some of the most stupid ones ever taken by any state and ultimately caused the end of Pakistan as it was born. It resembled an autistic, making repetitive actions that made no sense.

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When General Yahya Khan took over as the president and chief martial law administrator of Pakistan after removing F M Ayub Khan as the president in 1969, Yahya was advised by his secret service that while Sheikh Mujib and his party Awami League were popular in East Pakistan, they could never win outright majority in an election. This assessment was crucial because Bengalis of East Pakistan were in the majority and an outright win would mean leadership of entire Pakistan would shift to East Pakistan and Bengalis, something the army had no intention of accepting.

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A variety of other factors, particularly the cyclonic surge of 1970 on the coastal areas of East Pakistan which killed or maimed millions, made people extremely angry and they voted en masse for the Awami League, making the ballot a tool of expressing their anger at the Pakistani leadership. The electoral victory completely upset all military calculations and by January, according to some sources, the army had decided to act militarily. Not familiar with any methodology, except conspiracies and killing to resolve a situation and not exactly a believer in democracy, the military which had in effect become the guarantor of Pakistan decided to go for a quick kill. The intelligence agencies — friends, philosophers and guides of the Pakistan state — informed that the angry mobs of Dhaka slum dwellers and student activists were no match for an organised military attack to 'save Pakistan'. And taking care of them would take care of the situation.

Perhaps in no history has an army and its intelligence arm made such a suicidal and stupid assessment. Without even considering the consequence of a general armed uprising in case there was resistance, Yahya government assumed that if Dhaka and its 'militants' were put down, the rest of the Bengalis, like lambs, would follow. It never took into account that Pakistan didn't have the security, administrative and support structure in East Pakistan to contain any disturbance. And it never even thought that such a situation would almost be like putting a cherry into India's eager mouth.

It seems to have had taken for granted that India's far more efficient security structure was as dumb as its own. This was probably arrogance inspired stupidity but it was a fatal one.

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The initial reaction in Dhaka to the March 25 attack suited the Pak army as the people and the city were stunned. However, fuelled by anger at the news of Dhaka, people all over the rest of Bangladesh began their resistance against the Pak army. Bengali army officers of East Pakistan overnight became Bangladeshi army officers and fought back. Suddenly, the war which was so simple on the 25th night and was largely about the pacification of Dhaka had become a campaign to put down resistance all over entire East Pakistan which by then had ceased to exist. The intelligence agencies had never considered public resistance or rebellion by Bengali uniformed soldiers of Pakistan.

In Dhaka itself, by the next morning, from ordinary people to activists had decided to leave the city. Slum dwellers, a particular target of army wrath left for the villages en masse. Hindus left in great fear as they were the victims of targeted attacks and Bangladeshi political leadership also fled to sanctuaries. It was this departure of many that created a complex combination of people and victims which made both successful resistance and intervention inevitable.

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Between March 25 and end April, Bangladesh, now no longer East Pakistan, burned and retched fire. The army had to conquer every village, inch by inch and it was a humiliating and exasperating task for which they had no preparation, not to mention training. One of the worst things for Pakistan was the birth of Bangladesh political structure at the grassroots which was produced during this period as people banded together to fight Pakistan. Subsequently, when the freedom fighters returned from training in India, it was this structure – the Sangram Committee – which provided the support that led to the erosion from within of Pakistan.

Pakistan intelligence may not have assessed a resistance because it thought that the Bengalis were not martial enough or that Awami League's nationalist base was superficial but how it failed to read what India would do boggles the mind. Although Pakistan military and by extension the state existed to battle India – the state's sole objective – it assumed that India would do nothing when an opportunity was offered to it. It paid a massive price for this lack of intelligence and analysis.

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Pakistan believed that Hindus of Bangladesh, whom they all considered Indian agents, had 'infected' Bengali minds and generated the nationalist movement. It might seem absurd to believe this but when Mohiudding Alamgir of UPL, Muntassir Mamun and I visited Pakistan to talk about such issues in the year 2000, we saw how deep this conviction was. So both the Pakistan military and the people were in agreement that Hindus were bad for Pakistan. This resulted in the anti-Hindu campaign of the Pak military in 1971. It was probably geared towards sending Hindus to India. This part was temporarily successful but in the process, global public opinion was created against Pakistan as a demonic state and Indian intervention was marvellously possible and convenient.

India in fact would have been pushed to act anyway once 10 million people, both Hindus and Muslims, crossed to its soil. In no way could it sustain all those refugees by itself. So intervention was almost guaranteed as soon as the millions of scared Bangladeshis reached India. Pakistan provided the reason and justification. It was obvious that there was no option but to intervene on India's part and the plight of the refugees were bad enough to create a ground swell of international opinion against Pakistan and make intervention justified. Pakistan's policy to make Pakistan safe by pushing people out to India ensured that Pakistan would end.

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There is no end to the Pakistan puzzle. It seems from the very beginning, Pakistan assumed that both the US and China would intervene on its behalf when conflict escalated. But those superpowers didn't and never intended to. Pakistan believed that because it had brokered the US-China visit, both countries would be grateful and act. Yet there is no evidence that both states ever considered doing this. There is no explanation as to why Pakistan would think so considering no such intent was ever expressed by anyone. To put it mildly, it bends all common sense to think that Pakistan's security agencies risked the future of the country on a vague unfounded assumption.

Even in the last days when the war had broken out, Pakistan held on to the idea that the US 7th Fleet would resolve the issue in its favour. Nothing was farther from the truth because the US had accepted long before the end of "Pakistan" and was keener to avoid a South Asian war involving superpowers. It had no intention of any involvement to secure the territorial identity of Pakistan. It was the least intelligent assessment of international politics and compared to India's analysis, almost childishly immature. India thought "no superpower will ever come to fight our wars" and acted accordingly.

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In the end, it wasn't India or Bangladesh that defeated Pakistan but it was Pakistan bent on suicide. By handing over the state to its military and subverting its civil institutions and people's will, Pakistan was ready for humiliation and dismemberment long before March 1971. That year it turned the guns against its own people hoping political contests could be settled through brute force.

Occasionally history punishes as it did in case of Pakistan but lessons are rarely learnt if the state behaves without intelligence and acts like an autistic state.

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Afsan Chowdhury was part of the Muktijuddher Dolilpatra Project led by Hasan Hafizur Rahman from 1978 to 1986 which produced 15 volumes of documents on the history of 1971. For the BBC, he produced eight radio series and several chat shows on the issue on 1971. He has produced a video documentary on women and 1971 titled "Tahader Juddhyo". Afsan has edited and co-authored a four-volume history of 1971, "Bangladesh 1971".
He has worked in several parts of the world as a development and Human Rights specialist for the UN and other agencies. Afsan was the Oak Fellow on International Human Rights of the Colby College in the USA in 2008.