Turkey, Pakistan, and our diplomatic lethargy

Afsan Chowdhury
Published : 15 May 2016, 07:06 AM
Updated : 15 May 2016, 07:06 AM

Matiur Rahman Nizami's execution has led to reaction internationally not only from certain Human Rights outfits but countries like Turkey and Pakistan as well. Some European powers have opposed it on the grounds of being opposed to death penalty in principle. While the Pakistani reaction was expected, Turkey asking its envoy home for discussion was not.  However, it is not as yet a recalling of envoy, which is a more serious situation.

But while global public opinion has shifted towards accepting the right of Bangladesh trying the war criminals much more than when the trials began, some have raised other questions regarding the fairness of the trial and so on. In Muslim majority countries, there is still some resentment and hostility regarding the trials.

The trial exists in two spaces, just like any other international war crimes trial. It is in both the national and international space, and its respective politics too. How we navigate our way through this diplomatic water is important. The trial will need support to establish Bangladesh's status as a country from an under-developed region that is still able to hold high grade trials of sensitive nature.

But the problem is that our foreign office, tasked to do this at the global level has not been very effective. Outfits like Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee have done a better job at mobilizing national and international public opinion at the civil society level. Our foreign office needs to do much better.

For Pakistan, Nizami's trial is very important because he headed the Al-Badr.   This was a paramilitary outfit sponsored by the Pakistan army, an army that continues to be the most important institution in Pakistan.  It was armed and planned by them as a last desperate kamikaze attempt at revenge. It founded a band of militants who were capable of cold-blooded murder.  It was directly supervised by the Pak army in 1971 and carried out a plan devised by them.  So the trial was, in essence, also a trial of the Pak army.  Thus again the conviction was in a sense their conviction, and the hanging a symbolic punishment for them too. So the Pakistan reaction is obvious.

To us this land was Bangladesh, an independent country under Pakistani occupation.  But to Pakistan, it was a "secessionist" part of Pakistan, "who had been sorted out" but were still drifting away from military control. So obviously, 1971 and Al-Badr is their history as well.  The trial in general and Nizami's trial in particular was as close to a judgment on the Pakistan army as one can get. Hence the reactions, now and before.  Besides, Jamaat-e-Islami is still a powerful group in Pakistan and can't be ignored by PM Nawaz Sharif who is under severe pressure. The civilian government of Nawaz Sharif is in trouble because of the Panama papers leak where the Shareef family's name has come up. Meanwhile the army chief has asked the PM to clear his position on the corruption allegation, failing which some speculate another regime change might occur. So Pakistan itself is in political difficulties, and to ignore 1971 events involving the army is not possible. Further, most people in Pakistan are against the trials and this is a fair reflection of public opinion.

The situation in Turkey is different as President Recep Erdogan has been in power since 2003 and has weathered many storms, including from the Ataturk army opposed to him who have been neutralized significantly. What makes Erdogan powerful and unusual in a traditionally military powered country is that he leads an Islamic party – Justice and Development Party – in power for so long without the army's blessings. Although the Ataturk ideology-flavored army is "secular" and large sections of the upper middle and urban elite have strong nationalist bases, they have failed to dislodge him. The Ataturk parties have traditionally and had constitutionally depended on the military as a protector of "democracy and secularism" but Erdogan managed to survive their wrath. The culturally European part of the population ruled Turkey for so long but under Recep, the culturally Asian part has taken power. They are very traditional, oriental and highly sympathetic towards Islamic politics as they see it. That's his constituency and he is looking after their interest and ideology by taking the position of Nizami as an Islamist leader.

Erdogan faces major opposition at the international level and from within Turkey on several fronts. Syria remains the biggest problem for Turkey and its friend-enemy equation with Syria has made Turkey controversial. The forces arrayed against him include the formidable Russian Union, as well as the West. A Russian plane was supposedly downed by Turkey, and Putin threatened much but in the end Turkey survived with little damage. Turkey is powerful because the Syrian and the IS problem cannot be dealt without their involvement. Thus he enjoys reluctant acceptance from many quarters, including the West. It gives him flexibility in dealing with his national and international foes.

Erdogan has survived within Turkey because his Opposition of Left, Liberals, military and Kurdis are split into many groups, while his own Islamist party has remained united. He has openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, has been brutal with the Kurdis, has a very complicated relationship with the IS and has a list of friends and enemies that is his own. He has stuck his thumb at the EU and gotten away, and there is severe criticism of him within EU, as Europeans try to deal with a head of an EU state which is in effect their ideological enemy. He has had his Syrian refugee plans pushed through and survived many attacks by secular, left and nationalist terrorists. But he survives because to his constituency in Turkey, he comes across as a strong and defiant ruler.  Thus Turkey is protesting the hanging of an Islamist and not a war criminal as Bangladeshis see Nizami as. So Erdogan is also playing to his own crowd.

But the Bangladesh Foreign Office should have done a much better job in explaining to the world its position, both to hostile and friendly powers. Even the allies of the AL Government in the trial of the war criminals are disappointed with the efforts of both international diplomacy and criminal prosecution. Bangladesh has focused more on the national audience. In a way, all three countries have been concerned with the constituent audience mostly. While these are internal issues of any country, seeking international recognition of national trials for war crimes is important since it enhances prestige, reduces hostility and provides self confidence. For that to happen, the Bangladesh diplomats need to do their job much better.

A strategy for an aggressive diplomacy based on a priority list relating to 1971 issues is important. Bangladesh should utilize all international channels to press forward for its logical position at all levels and bodies, whether SAARC, OIC or elsewhere, and campaign internationally about how trial was one of war criminals and not politicians of any kind.