Pakistan election: a test of a ‘third force’

Those of us who long to see the emergence of a 'third force' could do worse than to observe the election in Pakistan. The election being held has already proven many analysts wrong. The outcome will have profound ramifications, not only for Pakistan but also for its neighbours and for wider geo-politics. The three main contenders, Pakistan Muslim League -N (PLM-N), Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), pose intriguingly different gambits towards international hegemony with the assumption of power.

Before we get into details, I want to highlight some interesting aspects of this campaign. The use of social media, for example, is said to be successful with urban youth; even more important has been the disclosure that it is very hard for a third force to break into in a first-past-the-post, aka 'winner takes all', voting system which generally and over time leads to a two-party competition.

The main criticism and also therefore the main obstacle for a new comer 'third force' is that established parties can win majorities of seats without winning majorities of votes, leaving a significant number of votes playing no part in determining the outcome. This happens in any election; for example in UK in 2005 Labour took a majority of seats, 57%, with only 36% of the vote; when the largest two parties took 69% of votes and 88% of seats, the smaller Liberal Democrat party took more than a fifth of the votes but only about a tenth of the seats in Parliament (source: wikipedia).

So from the onset an aspiring 'third force' will need to weigh up and choose carefully its method of entry. An obvious and historically proven alternative to avoid the election altogether is to build some sort of revolution but this can only be successful if (and it is a big 'if') there is overwhelming public and administrative backing for the 'third force'.

Another factor canvassed as the key for the 'third force' is voters' participation, particularly that of young and first time voters. They are most likely to be attracted to an alternative, even a risky option if they are made to believe in the cause. There is more to it though. Voter turnouts have been low in the last three elections in Pakistan – 44.55% in 2008, 41.80% in 2002 and 35.17% in 1997 (source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) – the apathy perhaps could be articulated as people's inability to see their vote having any effect on the governance of the country.

However, there could be other explanations such as wrong or inconsistent voter lists with duplicate/multiple entries or 'ghost votes' which may have lowered participation percentages. If this explains the lower turnouts, then the 'third force' may not get as many votes as it may expect. Nonetheless, the aspirant 'third force' is hoping to bring out more voters – the young as well as the apathetic – in the hope that they would vote for that 'third force'.

Still, this would be more likely to impact on urban constituencies.  In rural and remote areas local politics and the strength of long established MPs would make it difficult for a 'third force' candidate to unsettle them. Further externalities could also be at play – for example, in rural Sind, a traditional support base of PPP, the impact of the Benazir Income Support Program, Pakistan's flagship unconditional cash-transfer program for poor females, the first of its kind and named after the assassinated party leader is likely to secure many seats, and it counteracts the possible effects of an increased turn out.

As a result, the 'third force' has concentrated its efforts around its leader's Pushtun-Punjabi heredity in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (previously known as North-West Frontier province) and in urban Punjab, his home base.

Also relevant is that formation, patronage, acceptability or the resonance with citizens of a 'third force' could take a (long) while. It did for PTI. Though countries and their politics vary, a potential 'third force' has to be able to overcome the intricacies of inherent and wide-ranging issues. This is easier said than done. Taliban insurgencies have apparently have restricted campaign activities, but not those of Mr. Khan, with whom many guess the Taliban has had secret deals. This suspicion stems from the perception of his apparent lenient approach towards Taliban – a promise of negotiation and withdrawal of forces from tribal areas.

In short, there are substantial barriers to the introduction of a credible 'third force'. So the 'force' has to be agile and quick to manipulate any advantage.

Let us see what is being predicted. Two of the parties are well established and have been in power before, but failing to complete their terms, except for the most recent term completed by PPP.  Its reign was marred by shortfalls – a crippled economy, bombs, violence and humiliation, most notably the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad by their supposedly long term and strategic ally.

PPP also suffers from the usual burden of incumbency; above all, it has been hounded by huge corruption allegations against its leader. The judiciary, though accepted as independent, has held a terrible grudge against him and forced PPP to change Prime Ministers for not writing to the Swiss authority to re-open a corruption case against Mr. Zardari, widower of the former party leader. Its election campaign has been almost non- existent. Yet, it is expected to retain a lot of National Assembly (NA) seats in Sind, its stronghold. Many attribute this to lack of alternatives (other parties' organisational reach is limited in the province), and the welfare benefit scheme named after its late leader Benazir, has been popular in rural areas.

The clear front runner according to almost all news sources is PLM-N of the Sharif brothers, who are predicted to enjoy a clear majority by winning a large number of NA seats in their Punjab, the most populous state, hence also the state with the largest allocation of National Assembly seats, 148 out of a total 272. To form a majority government, parties need to win 137 of them. They apparently showcased their success in providing infrastructure – a metro bus system in Lahore and a freeway to the capital. Hailing from an industrialist business background they also enjoy a 'pro-business' tag. They are thought to have a sizeable loyal vote bank. The younger Sharif has also been the Chief Minister of the province, and he is regarded as a successful administrator and reformer. They are wary of the newcomer, who has gained considerable momentum in recent days, and, if at all, is the only one who could stop their gaining power for the third time.

Despite their feigned amiable gestures they have a few issues to settle with the establishment, if returned to power, who it seems has decided to refrain from interfering, at least for now.

The 'third force' PTI obviously benefits from not previously being in government; it appears to be drawing support mostly from urban youth, first time voters who it has been able to interest with its belligerent promises – ending the 'American War', 'Corruption', 'Education for all' – and frequent rallies in target areas. It has nominated a large number of new young candidates through an intra-party polling process that has been praised by the local press.

But other players who will hold a crucial balance, such as the Muttahida Quami Movement, with a strong base in Karachi, Balochistan National Party in the aggrieved province, a plethora of nationalist parties in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It is not an easy country to campaign in by any means with its vast ethnic diversity and traditional regional strongholds which have already cast shadows over the election.

When this is all said, I have not been able to find any analysis of constituency survey data; in other words, the above is mere conjecture. That too is from an individual who has never been to the country and only known it by its cricket teams. It may well prove to be a long shot. Even for the desperately driven 'third force'.

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Irfan Chowdhury writes from Canberra, Australia.

Reference:

The electoral information and analysis is sourced from:

1.       http://fiverupees.com/2013/05/08/the-definitive-fiverupees-election-post/

2.       http://kafila.org/2013/05/10/naya-pakistan-an-old-fable-ayesha-siddiqa/