The logic of hartal

Published : 1 April 2013, 03:57 PM
Updated : 1 April 2013, 03:57 PM

Hartal presents an interesting, though difficult and controversial, topic for analysis by social scientists. If what the news people and the 'media experts' say are any guide then we must agree that hartal is a very bad thing which imposes great inconvenience on the people and also harm the economy. Indeed, this might be found to be the view of the majority of the people if a quick survey were done. However, what people say and do need not always be consistent, and I suspect hartal is a case in point.

Hartal has been used as a political weapon against the government ever since M K Gandhi invented it to intensify the Indian independence movement. It has gradually evolved in Bangladesh into a potent political weapon in the repertoire of the opposition to embarrass and unseat the incumbent government. While hartal has been used sporadically by various political parties to advance their demands since liberation, it became more frequent and virulent since the latter part of the Ershad regime and the restoration of the system of freely elected government in 1991.

The march to elected parliamentary form of government after the fall of the dictatorial regime of General Ershad did not proceed as expected. Despite the fact that the election in 1991 was held under a neutral, non-party caretaker government constituted consensually, the Awami League (AL) refused to formally accept electoral defeat or congratulate Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP) that won the largest number of seats (though not an absolute majority). On the contrary, it discovered 'karchupi' (fraud) in the election outcome. Although the elected members of the party did take oath as members of parliament, they frequently boycotted parliament sessions, thus setting a trend of opposition boycott that were to become entrenched subsequently.

As the time for the next election approached, the opposition (i.e. AL) became intensely suspicious of the prospect of a free and fair election under the incumbent government. It demanded the institution of a neutral, non-party caretaker government during the election period (which was initially mooted by Jamaat). As the government was not receptive to the idea on the ground that it was contrary to the existing provisions of the constitution, the opposition resorted to frequent agitations and hartals to realise their demand. Eventually the government relented and amended the constitution to make provisions for a caretaker government. None of the nation's constitutional experts and legal minds at the time foresaw that the structure of the caretaker government had a fatal flaw.

A fresh national election was held in 1996 under a caretaker government. BNP lost the election and AL emerged as the single largest party although it did not win an outright majority. It formed a coalition government with some minor parties. The losers (BNP) did not accept the election results gracefully following the precedence set by the previous opposition and consolidated the boycott culture by absenting themselves now and then from the parliament.

The next election was held in 2001 relatively peacefully as serious doubts about the impartiality of the caretaker government did not arise yet. Although AL became suspicious when the caretaker government promptly reshuffled the bureaucracy to suit the perceived need of a free and fair election, it did participate in the election. The election results surprised many, the immediate past incumbent, i.e. AL, failed to secure even one-fifth of the seats.

Predictably, AL again discovered 'karchupi' in the election outcome and declined to formally acknowledge the winners. It intensified the trend of boycott and hartals. The virulence of the hartals increased markedly.

As the time for the next election neared and the identity of the chiefs of the Election Commission and the caretaker government became known, the constitutional flaw mentioned above became apparent. The constitution required the immediate past Chief Justice to be the Chief of the caretaker government. But the incumbent government chose the Chief Justice, and it could ensure that a loyal person is selected. This is precisely what AL alleged and refused to participate in an election held by a constitutionally appointed caretaker government. It resorted to mass movement and violent hartals to advance its demand for a neutral caretaker government. The violence of the movement turned extreme with the 'logi-baitha' demonstration that was vividly telecast to a stunned population by a number of television channels.

The intensity of the violence ensured that the constitutionally appointed caretaker government was overthrown and a 'military-backed' caretaker government was installed in January 2007, apparently with popular support. The new government, whose legality is still in question, ruled for two years in a virtual constitutional vacuum. Fortunately, it decided to hold an election for the next parliament.

The result of this election caught everyone by surprise. The AL-led coalition won nearly 90 percent of the parliamentary seats. BNP was virtually electorally massacred. BNP rejected the election results outright on the ground that the election was 'engineered'. But it followed the practice of taking oath as members of parliament and then boycotting it, only the period of boycott got longer.

The BNP-led opposition remained relatively calm during the first three and half years of the government being satisfied with staging occasional protest meetings and processions against the 'misrule' of the government and such things as price hike. But as the next election approached it had to confront the fact that the AL-led coalition had adversely tilted the level playing field by doing away with the non-party caretaker government through an amendment of the constitution.

Sensing that the election held under the current dispensation will be rigged, the BNP-led coalition now finds itself demanding exactly the same thing as did AL-led coalition in 1996. Interestingly, while both the major parties changed their positions on neutral caretaker government since the mid-1990s, only Jamaat has remained steadfast on the necessity of such an interim regime. It sided with AL in 1996, but this time it is with BNP.

Although the ICT trial and death sentences against Jamaat stalwarts have greatly complicated the political situation, the principal demand of the opposition coalition still remains the restoration of the caretaker government. It has already enforced several days of hartal to press home their demand and is gearing up for more. These hartals have already become quite violent, and with the progressive hardening of the attitudes of both sides it could get nastier.

The principal purpose of the narrative above is to bring out a single point: the hartals have been used by the opposition during the last quarter of a century as a political weapon against the incumbent government mainly to secure free and fair elections. If seeking people's mandate in a free and fair election is the objective why would the opposition enforce hartals that would supposedly inconvenience and even harm them? Wouldn't that be irrational? As it happened, every time a free and fair election was held, the opposition won the electoral battle handsomely. In this matter the politician's instinct proved to be right, at least so far.

This electoral fact immediately raises the question if people consider hartals and the associated violence to be very bad why do they so overwhelmingly vote for the opposition who perpetrate the hartals?

Some possible answers to the paradox are:

(1)            Actually people are not seriously opposed to hartals. This might sound frivolous at first, but a little thought should suggest that a very large section of the population including the rural population is not much affected by hartals. Even industrial establishments, such as garment factories, remain operational during hartals. Many institutions, such as schools, have found ways of working around hartals to minimise inconvenience.

(2)            People do regard hartals as bad, but their dislike of the incumbent government is greater such that they tend to support the opposition that agitates against the government. It can be argued that in this situation the opposition gains more by not resorting to hartals, but just focusing on elections. This may turn out to be true, but at the moment it is only an untested hypothesis whereas hartal is a tested and trusted weapon to unseat the government. If the opposition opts for a still untested non-hartal route under a partisan interim government, and it turns out to be wrong, the opposition would be condemned to wilderness for five years or more. It is unlikely that any opposition would risk this route when they have the hartal option. It should also be recognised that hartals perform the useful function of denting the credibility of the government and making it unpopular, and thereby enhancing the prospect of the opposition winning in a free and fair election under a non-party caretaker government.

(3)            Hartals badly affect only a small section of the population. Those who have their properties destroyed, those who cannot travel or reach their destinations, casual workers who lose their wages, and those who are physically hurt or have their near and dear ones killed or arrested should all be rather unhappy with hartals. However, they could be even unhappier with the government as they might blame the government for their plight. Furthermore, the larger part of the electorate may regard such sacrifice as acceptable cost of realising the goals. In this situation the opposition may correctly judge hartals to be favourable to their cause on balance.

Whether any (or all) of the above is true can only be established through a rigorous study; but it would seem that opposition's penchant for using hartals to realise their demand is a well thought-out political strategy that has succeeded repeatedly. Unless the opposition burn fingers at least once they are unlikely to consider any change in the strategy.

A common perception about hartals is that it imposes large costs on the economy. Pictures of torched vehicles, smashed shops, shuttered workplaces and empty roads during hartals create such an impression. Torching and smashing of vehicles and properties no doubt cause large losses to the individual victims, but the impact on the wealth of the macro economy is minuscule.

Of greater significance is the loss of GDP due to the shutdown imposed by hartals. However, no credible estimate of the economic loss has been made, and data spin doctors seem to have sway in this matter. One recent estimate puts the economic loss at $200 million for every day of hartal (Daily Star 26th March 2013). This would imply that if there is 30 days of hartal in this fiscal year (we already had 15) the total loss this fiscal would be $6 billion. This is equivalent to about 5 percent of the GDP. Hence, if such a large loss is actually suffered by the economy, the GDP growth rate this year should come down to about 1 percent. How likely is this to happen? We shall have to wait a few months until BBS publishes GDP estimates. For a guess we may look at the past evidence.

As mentioned above hartals have been used by the opposition to embarrass the government during the tenure of each government during the last quarter of a century with the intensity increasing during the election years. If hartals did cause serious economic losses then the growth rate should have dipped during the election years. However, Chart 1 below does not seem to support such a conclusion.

As evident from the chart, there are two marked dips in the growth rate: 2001-02 and 2008-09; and a smaller one in 1993-94. There were some hartals in 1993-94, but very few during 2001-02 and none in 2008-09.  Hence, it is difficult to argue that these dips in the graph were caused mainly by hartals. A more persuasive explanation is that these downturns were associated with sharp reductions in exports during these years (see Chart 1).

The demand for our exports is crucially dependent on the state of the global economy and trade.  Hence, there is also a close relationship between the country's exports and the volume of exports (or imports) of the world. This is borne out by Chart 2; a downturn in world exports pulls down our exports, and conversely.

The growth of global exports is in turn very closely related to global GDP growth rate.  Hence, the downturns in our economy were ultimately related to the health of the global economy.  The global economic downswing following the Dot-com bubble at the turn of the new millennium and the deep recession at the end of the first decade following the western financial meltdown caused the slide in the export income of the country during these years, which reduced the GDP growth rate.

If hartals were exacting a toll on the economy as claimed, then the worst-affected years should have been the latter part of the first and second BNP-led governments.  The growth rate during the former was above average of that era despite frequent hartals. The latter period saw the emergence of very violent hartals culminating in the 'logi-baitha' mayhem. Surprisingly, these years posted the highest growth rates (in two consecutive years) in four decades. It would be a bit far-fetched to argue that there were some adverse effects of hartals, but these were offset by other factors.

There does not seem to be much evidence so far of significant losses to the macro economy due to hartals. This is obviously at variance with the common perception of both experts and laymen, and is likely to be viewed with some skepticism. The onus is on the social scientists to explain the paradox more fully.

Epilogue

There can be no doubt that hartals do cause enormous harm to some people who get caught up in the violence. More than 100 people, including law-enforcers, have been killed during the last few weeks of political agitations, thousands injured and arrested, and much property destroyed. Life and property of every citizen of the country must be treated sacrosanct, no matter their importance in the macro economy. The government, as well as every citizen of the country, should do everything possible to prevent such tragic consequences. It is important that legitimate grievances of the opposition, including their concerns about elections which seem central, are heeded to and the lawful non-hartal avenues of protests are not closed off. Above all, there must be an attitude of tolerance and reconciliation among all parties if there is to be a fruitful attempt for a quick end to the current political impasse and mayhem.

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M A Taslim is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Economics, University of Dhaka.