The 15th amendment: Restoration in, caretaker system out, and political jhogra imminent

Afsan Chowdhury
Published : 3 July 2011, 06:31 PM
Updated : 3 July 2011, 06:31 PM

The 15th amendment to the constitution is done which achieves, after three decades, high symbolism by restoring the four fundamental principles of the 1972 constitution i.e. nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism. The same 15th amendment has also put an end to the non-partisan caretaker government system, the electoral facilitation tool which had made the BNP and the AL join elections. With it gone, politics and election have become uncertain. Is in the offing another row of disturbances followed by martial law like that we had in 2007 or something else? It is certainly not a formula for peace. Or is it that there are things that we don't know of that makes the government party confident?

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As far as restoration goes, secularism makes almost a full return to the original document. Secularism is the big gainer albeit with qualifications but in a state where social values rather than religious dominate, this gain may well be all about stating a position, not action. With Islam still there as the state religion, this is of little practical significance but more of an aspiration. Had the amendment incorporated some special rights for the minorities, it would be laudable but this part of the restoration is really taking credit for symbolism above all.

Little will also change by calling the 1971 war a national liberation struggle rather than a war of independence. Both are correct but while a liberation war is more of a process, the independence war is an event, that's all.

The more difficult one to live with is to describe all Bangladeshis as Bengalis in the nationalism part. It is incorrect as well since all citizens particularly those lumped together as adivasis are not ethnically Bengalis. It is also either saying that non-Bengalis particularly the CHT people are not part of Bangladesh's struggles or that only Bengalis live in Bangladesh, not any other people. Either way, it cuts badly for ethnic indigenous minorities but they shouldn't feel too bad. No matter by what name we call them, we will never treat them right.

Which leaves us with socialism — once a hallowed ideal and now more of an anachronistic joke. It is one part of the constitution that should be done away with and not just because in 40 years we have managed to increase social and economic injustice instead of reducing them but also because socialism is over and keeping it in the constitution has not even a symbolic meaning.

That leaves democracy and that is where the noise about the future most likely will be.

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The 15th amendment will be known for its actual substance, the abolishing of the non-partisan caretaker government. The system of having a non-partisan group in power was developed as a political tool in an environment of complete political distrust in 1991 between the AL and the BNP after the Ershad overthrow and was formalised in the constitution in 1996 through the 13th amendment.

This system actually endorses the fact that politicians in Bangladesh don't trust each other particularly in elections. It looks bad but there we are, that's us. The people may trust them for five years of their regime but that is between the supporters/voters and the party, and not between two parties. The way they behave towards each other when one is in power is a good reminder why the system had been put in place. What has changed since then that prompted this change is not clear or even observed.

In 2007, the BNP tried to stay in power by manipulating/abusing the nomination of the caretaker head of the government and triggered chaos. In the end through a farcical chain of events, Prof. Iajuddin became the chief adviser and the president at once becoming a sort of a constitutional clown. But laws and rules aside, it was the violent street agitation largely under the AL control that decided the fate of the moment with the army finally stepping in to restore order amidst public relief.

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Before the change, the AL had invited the BNP for talks but then barring once in 1991, when the 12th amendment reintroduced the parliamentary system, they have never even talked to each other. Both will do the same so the question of getting together and doing something is rather out of the question so to speak.

But is it possible that the AL wouldn't think that the BNP wouldn't do what it did to the BNP in 2007? It isn't exactly a complicated thing but just use the streets to make everything impossible. Knowing that fact, the AL decision becomes even more intriguing. There is however no way of knowing the political calculations that went on in the AL mind before deciding this abolition. Since it became obvious that the government was considering this change, politicians and commentators have been saying that it puts much of the future into uncertainty but it has had no effect. One therefore must assume that the parties involved know the risk that they are taking.

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In Bangladesh, political peace needs blessings and just as in 2007 it was there, is it possible that the same blessings have arrived in advance?  After all, if India and the US are ready to go along, the possibility of chance increases. If that happens, it would mean that the Islamist card may have played another trump because both the powers that matter are bothered by the Islamic radicals here. Indian PM Manmohan Singh's comment that a quarter of Bangladeshis are anti-Indian is an underestimation probably because many are so without being pro-Islamist. It would have sounded better if he had added that a quarter of Indians are also anti-Bangladeshi.

Nevertheless, it displays a genuine anxiety on its part. For the US, the lines are clear and why not? BNP has hobbled itself since birth by playing the India card and maybe it is going to reap more bitter political harvests.

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Khaleda Zia has already declared that, "All possibilities of holding a free, fair and impartial general election have been barred with the latest amendment to the constitution, and with this evildoing, confrontation has become a certainty in the country." So confrontation is almost certain.

But it is hardly the same party that challenged Ershad because the organisation is weaker. Khaleda has yet to give a call but hasn't and it will try to put together a structure before a challenge. Has this relatively weak BNP made the AL take the decision? Only time can tell.

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The Awami League had the parliamentary clout to pass the amendment but do they think that they can ignore the coming street drama? It is an intriguing question. Since the AL is a smart party with a long history of agitation, both in carrying it out and countering it as well, there must be a future plan. But what that could be is the mystery.

The first thing that they can do is what is usually done in such cases — arrest opposition leaders. Unfortunately, BNP knows this scenario all too well. Managing a movement using the next set of rulers when the main ones are inside is old hat for both parties. But who knows what has been planned and on both sides.

However, as the election is a little far away, the agitation has to be very long drawn. Again, the AL may be thinking that the BNP doesn't have the stamina to carry on for too long. But that's what every incumbent government since Ayub Khan of Pakistan had thought about the opposition including the AL in 1969. It could be true this time but history shows that the agitators have confounded the government almost every time in Bangladesh.

That is a very remote possibility but a very big gamble with serious consequence. If this doesn't work out, it leaves the other factor in, the army factor.

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In Bangladesh, the three political forces that can claim political power are the AL, the BNP and the Army. However, it is politically unsmart for the army to take power directly. Moreover, since the last Fakhruddin-Moeen episode, the army's popularity isn't as high. However, its role during the last election was much better when it didn't lean towards the BNP but had a positive result. Given that record, will it repeat its role again?

Constitutionally of course, the situation against any army action is high and the provisions against that exist there so the chances of  army rule directly is largely off but how extensive its role can be as a branch of the executive in support of the government can't be known and there is no constitutional bar to that either.

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In 2007, the army was concerned in its takeover about the impact of its role as rulers on its professional and better paid work as peacekeepers. However, the prospect of a terribly unstable Bangladesh which could generate a lot of Islamic militancy was a factor which led the bigger powers to support a military role in Bangladesh politics that would stabilise the dangerous situation in 2007. Should the army decide to lend a political helping hand, what could happen this time? Are the conditions the same or will be when election time comes? Will the army risk its pay pocket to help out? Is there a risk?

We are not talking takeovers but extensive support by the military to the civil, so would the AL have decided without feeling the army's mood? The army is the last protector of the government and so is it possible that some sort of an understanding may already have come into place?

Should the army support the AL and the public perception of it is of a partisan rather than a national army, what will be the cost and risk of that transaction? Or will the situation evolve in such a way that its entry will again become inevitable and then it will be taken from there? But what happens if a group within the army feels and decides that it is the BNP which is the more convenient patriotic party and require their support?

The army has become the king maker in Bangladesh politics. Each three represent one-third of the strength and when two join hands, power shifts that way.

Is it stability Bangladesh style?

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Afsan Chowdhury is a journalist and researcher.